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Vanishing Center: Virulent Zones x A Time of Lost Gods

When I began reading Lyle Fearnley’s Virulent Zones: Animal Disease and Global Health at China’s Pandemic Epicenter (2020), I was struck by an isomorphism of our projects in spite of their apparent distance of themes—pandemic prevention and spirit mediumship, which are often rendered, respectively, global and local in scale. But as Fearnley put it in his book: “the pandemic epicenter is not best understood as a local place,” and I would say the same of the place of mediumship (161). The starting point and geography of thought in both our works might be described as something like: What is it to travel toward a troubled center and proclaimed origin, and what might we find by tracing the spatialization of troubles? Using Fearnley’s term via Georges Canguilhem, how might processes of displacement operate with respect to this figure of origin?

Virulent Zones reads like a detective novel uncanny in its timeliness to collective conditions today, as it follows the travails of scientists across continents, trying to locate the origins of viral pandemics. The mytho-etymological origin of pandemic-as-disease begins with late-nineteenth century efforts to track the so-called Russian flu using then-novel telegraph technologies, from the Caucasus to Russia to Western Europe and then around the globe through colonial outposts in Africa and Asia (note the reversed directionality of the movement between metropole and colony compared to later imaginaries).

Such efforts at tracking would intensify with the establishment of the WHO after WWII, with propositions for a worldwide influenza surveillance program, tethered to hopes of protection through timely vaccination—specifically, as phrased in WHO meeting notes from the time: “to protect countries yet unattacked” (32). Tensions arose between “national biosovereignty” (Ong 2010) and global health ideals of a border-crossing transparency. But as Fearnley notes, his project takes a different approach to space and sovereignty than the duality of national claims to sovereignty and normative claims to global health.

In Fearnley’s work, the ‘globe’ of global pandemics takes shape through two forms of surveillance: the international stationing of labs, and the microbiological discernment of antigen variation, where risks at the planetary scale become visible at the microscopic scale (here I bring the term discernment from mediumship, as there’s also a question for the mediums I worked with of what becomes perceivable of the global or cosmic scale, through the discernment of spirits at the interface of the porous body and psyche).

Yet again, the figure of the nation-state doesn’t simply retreat between the microscopic and the planetary. By 1957, a dramatic new hypothesis was born, writes Fearnley: “China could be the source of pandemic influenza viruses” (33).

Curiously, this imputed spatial origin landed precisely at the vanishing point of that which did not allow spatial access amid Cold War politics.[1] Mainland China sat precisely outside of the WHO’s surveillance network at the time, a black hole at the center of the map, which teams of international scientists would be pulled toward yet be shut out of, forced to orbit around its edges—Hong Kong, Thailand, Vietnam.

Simultaneously, an “alternate ‘world center’” was being formed (35). While it remained inaccessible to certain outsiders, researchers within the People’s Republic were working in parallel, and were among the first to draw links between animal flus and human epidemiology; questions arose there as to whether new viral variants were homegrown or imported.

So while the world of scientists on one side of the iron curtain approached China as the untouchable pandemic epicenter, an alter-world sat on the other side, itself the center of the virological rather than the viral.

In thinking of alternate world centers, it’s useful to bring in the notion of displacement, which provides both the narrative movement and core argument to the operations of science in Fearnley’s text. Drawing on Canguilhem’s concept of scientific ideology, Fearnley shows ethnographically how scientists in search of a pandemic origin don’t rigidly cling to their scientific object, nor are they merely self-certain heroic virus hunters as they may often be portrayed.

Instead, moving along their paths, scientists are displaced again and again by the people, places, and things they encounter. To quote Canguilhem: “Scientific ideology does indeed stand over a site that will eventually be occupied by science… when science eventually supplants ideology, it is not in the site expected” (1994: 36). In this, now in Fearnley’s words, “scientific ideologies lay out a direction of inquiry, but the actual results of that inquiry are pushed in unexpected directions” (53).

Across the text, Fearnley shows how theories of a centralized, spatialized origin are in fact quietly displaced again and again as the scientists enter rural spaces of the ‘field’: the use of remote sensing displaced notions of a single epicenter by identifying numerous double-cropped rice paddies thought to heighten risk of viral transmission; previous boundaries of wild versus domestic birds were displaced by Chinese farmers who actually bred and cultivated “wild” swan geese for traits of wildness—internalizing the boundary of wildness and domestication through the body of the goose rather than the determining it through the exterior space they occupied with relation to human agricultural landscapes. The center gets scattered; lines of discernment shift.

Now I turn to my own work in A Time of Lost Gods: Mediumship, Madness, and the Ghost after Mao (2020), attempting to displace and reread it through Fearnley’s concepts. The book is set in Henan, a heavily agricultural province in central China whose landlocked position once conjured a grand sense of civilizational center (with agriculture and sedentary settlement precisely a source of civilizational pride). But now—after post-Mao market reforms that redirected the future toward coastal factory cities—such an ‘inland’ (neidi) position conjures a sense of backwardness and abjection, a space out of time. A black hole at the center of the map.  

Beyond philanthropic evocations of impoverished rural backwaters, Henan is potent in the post-reform national imaginary as a source of charlatans and thieves. Urban friends and colleagues in the PRC tried to dissuade me from going with the term buhao, not good; those in Henan would speak of its own poverty as a source of lai—of the amoral, unreliable, and deceitful. At the same time, I was also told by friends in the city that mediumship no longer existed in today’s China, at least among the Han ethnic majority. Nonmodern practices, accordingly, ‘remained’ only among China’s so-called ethnic minorities.

My journey toward Henan in search of mediumship thus mirrored Fearnley and Fearnley’s scientists in some ways—in their case the sense of an unreachable epicenter filled with a surplus potentiality of disease, in my case the sense of a hollowed center filled with a density of the ‘bad’ and a sensation of what is no longer there.

Such an abject rendering of a collapsed former center belies a curious interval between the image of civilizational origin and that of the land-locked “left behind”—an interval spirit mediums and villagers alike called “the time when Chairman Mao reigned.” As I describe in Lost Gods, the figure of the peasantry gathered a certain force throughout modern Chinese history, first as a new literary object of pity and concern, then as a potential propelling force for the revolution to come.

With the vast majority of its population in the countryside and surrounded by urban-centered formulations of Communist revolution, Mao, building on the early Chinese Communist thinker Li Dazhao, refigured the Chinese peasantry as the heart of the nation’s suffering, and by extension, at the heart of global class struggle (Spence 1990). Through political campaigns involving oral storytelling practices throughout villages, the suffering of individual peasants were “telescoped” across local, regional, national, and world-historical scales, producing a cosmocratic mythologic (Apter and Saich 1998).

The fate of the peasantry was thus linked concentrically to the future of world history, as the Chinese village became metonymic of a planetary potential for equality. To augment Fearnley’s phrasing: “The revolutionary epicenter is not best understood as a local place.” And it is this world-historical time-space, condensed in the Maoist village, that becomes inverted once again in the post-reform era, as the rural and the peasantry were rendered sources of anachronism and stagnation in China’s now marketized economy.

Amid this scene of chronotopic displacement, the mediums I met found themselves not just at the hollowed center, but also what Fearnley might call an “alternate world center.”[2] In the wake of Mao’s death, they describe a landscape repopulated by demonic spirits and corrupted deities since market reforms. Mao, for them, was not the secular figure of religious repression as so often portrayed in Western accounts, but rather a figure if divine sovereignty sent from the heavens to save China from full foreign domination.

During Mao’s reign, the mediums say, demonic spirits vanished in fear. With Mao’s death, corrupted gods and ghosts swarmed back, mirroring and provoking human greed. In their rituals, they work to discern between virtuous and corrupt spirits, annihilating the corrupt. They keep their eyes toward a messianic horizon of a “true socialism” to come—a time of true equality, following an apocalyptic end of this world. The center of the new world would be none other than the true center of the virtuous world—Henan province—no longer the “not there” it appears in the guise of today.

To partake in this otherworldly revolutionary work, the mediums undergo continuous spectral displacements—the displacement of their own body and soul by invisible occupying forces. Spirit possession in the post-Mao era is considered especially risky, since the spirits themselves have become charlatans, with the bad masquerading as the good, ghosts masquerading as gods. Yet one cannot perceive (and therefore cannot rid of) corrupt spirits without opening themselves up to these displacements, which may provoke illness or even death. They call this spiritual work “walking Chairman Mao’s path.”

In both Fearnley’s and my own text, then, there seems to be a pairing of displacement and what might be termed determination, with relation to a troubled space of origin. Knowledge through displacement and a will to knowledge. This brings me to a recent comment by Christian Sorace in a talk on anti-China politics in the recent US elections, reflecting on the role of China scholars. As Sorace (2020) put it: “It does not matter how much we know, unless something changes at the level of our desire;” thus, “what matters is not merely the production of knowledge per se, but the ways in which knowledge… is inscribed in our own economies of desire.”

I thus find myself left with a thought after walking through both our texts: to what extent is displacement a counterforce to centralization, given the gravitational pull of the black hole? If the allure of scientific ideology is precisely that it stands in the place of a science-to-come, then what of displacement amid grander movements? In light of the more recent history of COVID-19, I find myself wondering if and how the desire for knowledge of China as pandemic epicenter, and the desire for the figure of the heroic virus hunter or vaccine inventor, are indeed displaced by the travails encountered during the scientific process.

On the side of the mediums, I think of Hoon Song’s (2016) writing on sovereign faciality in North Korea, in which the face of the sovereign too lends itself to the historical gap and promise of a knowledge to come. Both the displacements of the scientists and the displacements of the mediums, in this sense, do not quite bring them to abandon the search for center, albeit the new center found—to return to Canguilhem—may not be at the site expected.

I return, then, to the mediums, and how their embodied displacements simultaneously implicate a centripetal movement of recentering: of conjuring a world lost; and rather than a simple nostalgia or a concession to mediumship’s anachronization, they live on in the wake of sovereignty, as the face of the lost sovereign gazes back at the present like the angel of history, standing in the place of the future. I imagine the gravitational draw of this gaze, whose inverted pull may just turn the world inside out, catapulting it toward new horizons, viral, spectral, or otherwise.


Emily Ng is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis, University of Amsterdam. She is author of A Time of Lost Gods: Mediumship, Madness, and the Ghost after Mao (2020). Her recent work has been undertaken as part of the collaborative project Imagining the Rural in a Globalizing World (RURALIMAGINATIONS, 2018-23), funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (#772436). 

  

References: 

Apter, David E., and Tony Saich. 1998. Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 

Canguilhem, Georges. 1994. A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings from Georges Canguilhem. Edited by François Delaporte. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. New York: Zone Books. 

Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 

Fearnley, Lyle. 2020. Virulent Zones: Animal Disease and Global Health at China’s Pandemic Epicenter. Durham: Duke University Press Books. 

Ng, Emily. 2020. A Time of Lost Gods: Mediumship, Madness, and the Ghost after Mao. Oakland: University of California Press. 

Ong, Aihwa. 2010. “Introduction: An Analysis of Biotechnology and Ethics at Multiple Scales.” In Asian Biotech: Ethics and Communities of Fate. Edited by Aihwa Ong and Nancy N. Chen. Durham: Duke University Press. 

Peeren, Esther. 2006. “Through the Lens of the Chronotope: Suggestions for a Spatio-Temporal Perspective on Diaspora.” In Diaspora and Memory, (13): 67–77.  

Sorace, Christian. 2020. “Anti-China Politics in the US Election.” Webinar from Critical China Scholars, Location, October 28, 2020. https://criticalchinascholars.org/webinars/#Election.  

Spence, Jonathan D. 1990. The Search for Modern China. New York: Norton. 

Song, Hoon. 2016. “North Korea’s ‘Succession’ of Marxism.” Boundary 2 43 (3): 79–104. 

 

Notes

[1] I take vanishing point from the title of Virulent Zone’s conclusion, which Fearnley draws from Brian Massumi’s note on his translation of “flight/escape” in Deleuze: “Both words translate fuite… Fuite covers not only the act of fleeing or eluding but also flowing, leaking, and disappearing into the distance (the vanishing point in a painting is a point de fuite)” (1987, xvi). China thus sat at the horizon where the scientists’ gazes—their lines of sight—were led, but the there there vanished upon arrival.

[2] See Esther Peeren (2006) on the chronotope as that through which displacement and interpellation are occasioned, doubled through time and space.  

 

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